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Expanding the Horizons' of Horizontal
Inquiry into Rights Consciousness: An
Engagement with David Engel
MICHAEL MCCANN*
ABSTRACT
This Comment interprets and reflects on the key features of David
Engel's argument about the importance of balancing vertical models of
rights diffusion with horizontal ethnographic studies of how rights
consciousness develops out of practical experience in everyday social
contexts. The primary focus is on endorsing the general argument and
amplifying some understated or undeveloped dimensions of Engel's
position. In particular, this reflection makes the case for: 1) expanding
the range of subjects and contexts subjected to horizontal study,
including especially greater attention to "haves" and elite actors; 2)
studying subjects expected to have high rights consciousness as well as
those likely to demonstrate low rights consciousness so as to develop more
comparative theorizing; 3) adding more refined sociological analysis of
context and power to the ethnographic study of subject consciousness,
again to advance comparative theorizing about factors that encourage or
discourage rights consciousness; and 4) to sharpen attention to
variations in the substantive content as well as relative salience of rights
consciousness among subjects, which in turn may disrupt assumptions
about the assumed automatic identification of rights discourses with
neoliberal hegemony. Many examples from sociolegal scholarship are
cited to illustrate and support the various analytical points.
Gordon Hirabayashi Professor for the Advancement of Citizenship, University of
Washington. I would like to thank David Engel for a splendid article and Angelina Godoy,
Arzoo Osanloo, Bernadette Atuahene, and David Engel for conversations and comments
about my response. This Article was written while I was a Fellow in the Law and Public
Affairs program at Princeton University.
1. The Free Online Dictionary defines "horizon" as "[tihe apparent intersection of the
earth and sky as seen by an observer." Horizon Definition, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.thefreedictionary.comlhorizon (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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INTRODUCTION
David Engel has enlightened us with another very important article
about the meanings and practices of rights. This new Article builds on
themes present in his important early work on Thailand, on small
communities in the United States that discourage personal injury
litigation, and on people with disabilities in the United States following
the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
However, the new Article draws directly from the fascinating
findings of David and Jaruwan Engel's recent book, Tort, Custom, and
Karma. In short, the Engels offer considerable evidence that injured
persons in the northern Thai province of Chiangmai have actually found
rights and law less meaningful for dealing with their grievances as
social life has changed in the face of global economic integration. 2 This
conclusion flies in the face of widespread hortatory scholarly claims or
approving assumptions that Western law and rights discourse are
trickling down from transnational and national levels everywhere,
increasingly saturating experienced social life around the globe. Where
this diffusion is not evident, Engel suggests, scholars and policy elites
often lament the local forces that resist or impede the benevolent
expansion of rights norms and practices. Engel questions these
assumptions in several respects: for ignoring the disjuncture between
elite activists and ordinary people on the ground; for wrongly treating
the latter as passive recipients of ideas from on high; for blaming
traditional culture as an impediment to enlightened diffusion; and for
overlooking the problematic limitations and costs of embracing rights as
social conventions.
The key analytical contribution of Engel's Article, therefore, is in
offering an alternative understanding about the processes by which
consciousness and meaning develop in social life. Engel insists that
most people do not construct meanings by passively internalizing
exogenously produced ideas that trickle down from above. Indeed, as his
opening anecdote about the official poster endorsing children's rights in
the Thai schoolhouse wonderfully illustrates, elite or officially generated
messages, cues, and values often are relatively meaningless or alien to
the intended target populations. Instead, he argues, "individual rights
consciousness derives from the intersections of a person's life experience
with the particular interpretive frameworks that are available in the
2. DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA:
GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND (2010).
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social environment."3 The development of consciousness entails a
dynamic, fluid, often uneven process that builds on life experience in
different social settings and in relationship to other people. Moreover,
"the relevance of rights depends in large part on how individuals come
to understand their own identities and on the stories they and others
tell in order to make sense of their lives."4 Engel suggests that every
person's rights consciousness is as distinct and variable as that person's
particular life, although his findings confirm that groups of people who
share some features of a common life may display similarities in rights
consciousness. In Chiangmai, after all, rights were not very meaningful
for most of the "ordinary" people he interviewed.5
This analytical understanding of how rights consciousness develops
in turn leads Engel to prescribe a particular method of study. Rather
than tracking a vertical trickling down of ideas or explaining the
obstacles to such top-down diffusion, Engel proposes that researchers
adopt a horizontal perspective or methodology. In short, such a mode of
inquiry focuses directly on studying ordinary people in everyday
interactions, using a mix of ethnographic protocols and intensive
interviewing to map their understandings, to document their actions,
and to try to make sense of the linkages between experience, meaning,
and practice. The Engels' book confirms that they "encouraged
interviewees to provide an extended narrative covering a broad sweep of
time, in which they described their lives from childhood to present and
the changes that had occurred in their social environment" as well as
the specific incidents surrounding their injury.6 This technique owes
greatly to the creative, rigorous, and laborious methodology of exploring
personal life histories to make sense of rights consciousness that Engel
and Frank W. Munger developed in their marvelous book, Rights of
Inclusion.7 In short, Engel feels we researchers should labor to
understand ordinary people in their own terms, within the framework of
personal experience and social context from which meaning is
constructed over life histories. And in doing so, we should not presume
that rights or other legal categories endorsed by distant elites figure
prominently or consistently as meaningful dimensions of their social
consciousness. At best, we should treat familiar claims about global
3. David M. Engel, Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on Rights Consciousness, 19
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423, 427 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 435.
6. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 2, at 13.
7. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY
IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003). The methodology of the
book is discussed most directly in the Introduction, pp. 7-9.
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diffusion of rights as a research question rather than as a settled
conclusion.
In my reading, Engel thus exhibits a complex, nuanced posture
toward the vertical approach. On the one hand, he does, as noted above,
warn of its problematic analytical and normative assumptions regarding
the diffusion of meaningful norms, concepts, and values (like rights). On
the other hand, Engel does not dismiss the vertical approach as
worthless or entirely wrongheaded; indeed, he praises the vertical
perspective for calling attention to transnational and state level
advocates of rights ideas and for generating important insights into
their activities. His primary position thus is the diplomatic one of
avoiding an either/or position and urging instead balance in pursuit of
both vertical and horizontal approaches. Put another way, Engel wants
to call attention to the distinctive contributions of horizontal
perspectives and studies that can compensate for the limitations and
deficiencies of vertical approaches. Although his cumulative studies in
the United States and Thailand would seem to support a skeptical
expectation, Engel is careful not to argue directly that he expects
horizontal studies to demonstrate a less ubiquitous and uniform
embrace of rights discourse and deployment than many neoliberal
scholars predict.8
I. ENGEL IS ON SOLID GROUND
I welcome and find quite compelling virtually all of Engel's
argument. I begin with his findings about low rights consciousness in
the northern Thai community that he studied. As he points out, many
scholars have identified a low salience of rights in individual legal
consciousness among citizens even in the United States, where rights
are the topic of a hallowed official national discourse. After all, Stuart
Scheingold, who famously wrote in 1974 about a "myth of rights" that
permeates American culture, qualified his argument in many ways. 9
Scheingold recognized that only scattered evidence supports his view
and that convincingly studying deep beliefs and practical values is
difficult. Moreover, Scheingold underlined that the evidence suggests
8. I am thinking in particular of three classic works: David Engel, The Oven Bird's
Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 551 (1984); ENGEL AND MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN
THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 7; and ENGEL AND ENGEL,
TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA: GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND,
supra note 2.
9. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 13-79 (2d ed. 2004) (1974).
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that the upper and perhaps middle classes are most inclined to invoke
rights while marginal groups, especially the poor and racial minorities,
seem least convinced by the legitimacy of the legal system and practical
value of rights discourse. 10 George Lovell recently surveyed the
scholarly literature on "ordinary legal consciousness" in the United
States to reconsider Scheingold's thesis, and Lovell confirmed that there
is still little evidence supporting the claim that a deep, active rights
consciousness seems to thrive among citizens in the United States.1
From the early studies of the Civil Litigation Research Project showing
that most people "lump it" (e.g., internalize blame and endure) when
they suffer injury, through the legions of ethnographic inquiries into
ordinary legal consciousness, Lovell concludes that there simply is little
support for the assumption that rights conventions trump other
discursive frameworks for meaning making. 12 For one thing, rights
conventions regularly compete with other moral, religious, therapeutic,
technocratic, and pop discourses. Moreover, rights do not seem to figure
prominently because they do not produce much practical power in
action, and in fact acting on rights can be emotionally, financially, and
interpersonally costly.
These findings seem to support Engel's logic. In short, people
continue to choose some discursive conventions over other "available"
conventions because they demonstrate greater practical power to make
sense of relationships, provide resources to advance interests, and
generally empower people in negotiating everyday interactions. It is this
criterion of "practical utility" that is critical to the relative and shaky
appeal (or lack thereof) of rights. This is the thrust of John Gilliom's
study of Appalachian welfare mothers,' 3 Laura Beth Nielsen's study of
how ordinary people think about noxious racist and sexist street
harassment,14  Kristin Bumiller's argument that claiming
antidiscrimination rights actually only compounds a sense of
victimization,' 5 and Engel's study with Frank Munger demonstrating a
10. Id. at 62-79.
11. George Lovell, The Myth of the Myth of Rights, STUD. L., POL., & Soc'Y. (forthcoming
2012).
12. On the Civil Litigation Research Project and "lumping it," see Richard E. Miller &
Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 525, 527-28 (1980-81). The wide range of scholarship that Lovell surveys is
greater than what can be referenced here.
13. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001).
14. See LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE
PUBLIC SPEECH (2004).
15. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 2-4 (1988).
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common, but not uniform, reluctance of people with disabilities to claim
or even embrace a rights framework to deal with their challenges. 16
There is evidence for this claim beyond the United States, in studies
by authors other than Engel. For example, Bernadette Atuahene found
that rural South African blacks felt frustrated, perplexed, and resigned
after receiving none of the reparations granted by the nation's highest
court for property appropriated by whites during the apartheid era.
After gaining little from a judicial victory, the promise of rights as a
resource simply made little sense to rural blacks exploited by whites for
many generations, even in post-apartheid South Africa. 17 In short, much
socio-legal scholarship demonstrates not only that law in action is
different from law on the books, but broad ideological exhortations by
elites about the promises of rights often ring hollow at local levels to
people struggling in everyday life. And if this is true within national
life, Engel's finding about how transnational human rights advocacy
often seems alien and relatively meaningless to ordinary people on the
ground likewise seems quite plausible. As such, his exhortation to
investigate whether rights constructs are prominent in the legal
consciousness of ordinary people "on the ground" seems like a very
sensible research agenda.
Likewise, there is much to be said for Engel's general horizontal
methodology of investigating and documenting the legal consciousness
of people. His primary recommendation is to talk to ordinary people in
the familiar sites and spaces of routine life. In their book, the Engels
interviewed several dozen people at length in hospitals where they had
been treated for injuries. The goal of such interviewing was to
"understand the subjectivity of the narrators-how they interpret
events, how they explain their own behavior and that of others, and how
they view themselves in relation to the world around them and in
relation to legal norms, procedures, and institutions."'8 The focus is to
probe subjects' accounts of their thinking to look for whether
globalization has altered spatial and temporal frameworks, concepts of
the self, relationships to others, norms and procedures related to justice,
and religious values or beliefs.19 The key to sound research, again, is for
16. ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 7, at 4. They summarized in the Introduction: 'We
wanted to interview not only those whose rights consciousness was high but those who
were indifferent to rights, those who endured rather than resisted, those who were loners
as well as joiners, even those who were unaware ... about the existing legal foundations
of potential rights."
17. Bernadette Atuahene & Sanele Sibanda, The Limits of the Law: The Story of the
Popela Community, Address at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (May 30,
2011).
18. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 2, at 12-13.
19. Id. at 5-6.
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the researcher to suspend assumptions and to listen and report on what
subjects relate.
Engel's methodology is a rigorous, careful version of approaches
taken by many of the scholars I mention above (Gilliom, Nielsen,
Atuahene, etc.) who are interested in legal consciousness from what
Engel labels a horizontal perspective. That I endorse this should not be
surprising to readers who recognize the similarities and differences
between Engel's trademark studies and my own studies of legal
mobilization by individuals and groups.20 Our approaches begin
similarly from a challenge to top-down or "vertical" approaches as a way
of understanding the development of legal rights consciousness. In my
case, that involves challenging both judicial impact and structuralist
accounts of legal meaning production. We similarly tend to focus on
aggrieved persons and how they frame understandings of their
grievances and the possibilities for seeking redress, as well as the
actions that they take. My work is no less interested in how people
develop legal consciousness over time out of practical experience
negotiating a multiplicity of available cultural resources. I do not
presume that legal consciousness privileges rights over other normative
constructs or that formal legal action like litigation is a common,
positively embraced practical option. My research questions how people
think about and act in relationship to legal norms like rights. I have
spent a great deal of time interviewing aggrieved citizens, probing how
they think about their grievances and options, and trying to make sense
of how their modes of consciousness have developed out of disputing
activity over time. My earlier research probed, but did not present
personal life histories much; my coauthored book, just recently begun,
on immigrant Filipino workers 21 makes personal history and
intergenerational social history a key topic, self-consciously building on
Engel's work. As such, I welcome Engel's invitation to continue that
type of inquiry and his thoughtful reframing of what is required and
potentially gained by the horizontal perspective.
II. EXPANDING THE TERRAIN OF HORIZONTAL STUDY
Overall, I heartily endorse Engel's questions about the limits of the
unilateral vertical explanation for rights diffusion and his proposal
20. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
21. The research is funded by the National Science Foundation (SES1060698) and
includes George Lovell as co-principal investigator and co-author. We are planning a long
book, tentatively titled A Union by Law: Filipino Cannery Workers and the Trans-Pacific
Struggle for Equal Rights, along with many articles on many facets of the research.
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endorsing horizontal modes of study into rights consciousness that grow
out of local experience. However, I am concerned that his
conceptualization of horizontal modes of study may be understood in
ways that narrow the types of subjects that he locates on the proverbial
ground and what we look for when we study them. My Comment thus
offers several related points aiming to amplify and augment his call to
expand the contours of whom, how, and what we look for in research on
legal consciousness and rights practice.
A. Expanding the Range of Ordinary People in Everyday Contexts
Under Study
Engel repeatedly refers to "ordinary" people in "everyday"
interaction as the focal point of the horizontal methodology. But what
does he mean? One plausible reading of what Engel intends to connote
is that "ordinary" people are non-elites; that ordinary people are those
on the lower rungs of the economic and political ladder, those with only
modest status, position, and connections-perhaps even the
marginalized and subaltern. This is a plausible reading of Engel
because a great deal of study by scholars regarding ordinary or everyday
legal consciousness is narrowly limited to a somewhat romantic
enchantment with relatively low income, marginalized, individualized,
and politically inactive people, thus linking ordinariness with relative
powerlessness. Moreover, the fascinating case study of Thai villagers
that Engel summarizes so eloquently in his Article further invites such
an interpretation of his argument.
However, I call attention to Engel's appeal, made somewhat in
passing, that horizontal studies could be directed toward multiple
"fields of social interaction" and "broader social classes or strata,"22 And
it is this point about expanding the range of people and sites of
interaction subjected to horizontal study that I enthusiastically want to
amplify. Indeed, we would benefit from horizontal study of corporate
executives, transnational nongovernmental organization (NGO)
activists, media shapers and pundits, university scholars and
intellectuals, injurers and injured persons of all types, and surely those
that seem potentially influential to any particular type of policy issue or
community matter. Really, we ought to look at any category of social
actors that we can imagine. It seems to me that an experience-based
horizontal approach can be used for any strata of individuals or any
setting. We need to expand studies to more types of people and
especially beyond the widespread focus on the "have nots." After all, the
22. Engel, supra note 3, at 448.
EXPANDING THE HORIZONS
"haves" exercise great institutional power and exploring their rights
consciousness (or lack thereof) is important for understanding how law
constrains or facilitates the exercise of that social power. Such studies
can go a long way to testing the famous claim by E.P. Thompson that
"[t]he rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more
than a sham .... They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at
the same time, they may curb that power and check its intrusions."23
And there is no reason why such studies need to be joined to the
vertical perspective about top-down diffusion and passive
internalization. I again agree with Engel that one of the most
interesting features of Sally Merry's book Human Rights and Gender
Violence24 is the ethnography of transnational and cosmopolitan human
rights activists. Merry wanted to know how they think and why and
how their legal consciousness emerged amidst the particular types of
structured interactions and experiences. Merry seems every bit as
interested in how the "rights consciousness" of NGO activists "derives
from the intersections of a person's life experience with the particular
interpretive frameworks that are available in the social environment."25
In short, she offers a compelling horizontal study of those activists and
how they developed their particular legal consciousness that is
relatively independent of the problematic vertical assumptions that she,
as Engel insightfully argues, exhibits about top-down diffusion or
translation at 'lower" local levels. In their own collectively experienced
worlds, the legal consciousness of transnational activists and how they
construct meaning is as ordinary and everyday as it is for villagers.
Only by expanding the range of actors whom we study horizontally
can we begin to develop a more comparative and analytically refined
understanding of how the experiences of different subjects do or do not
engage with law and rights. Moreover, in any ongoing dispute or public
policy matter, it makes sense to understand the legal consciousness and
constructed legal claims of all parties prominently involved in the
ongoing interactive relationship. This can facilitate a shift from a
unilateral focus on the rights consciousness of the injured to a more
multilevel and interactive understanding of the variety of rights
orientations-including those where rights figure only weakly or not at
all-in a potential or developing contentious relationship involving
injury. This is as important for the variously situated actors that might
have a stake in issues of liability for harm and potential redress as it is
for the injured, upon whom Engel focuses.
23. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 265 (1975).
24. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
25. Engel, supra note 3, at 427.
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B. The Importance of Studying Ordinary Rights Activists
While Engel does point to such an enlarged range of subjects and
sites that deserve horizontal study, he also gestures toward distinctions
between ordinary practices of ordinary people "on the ground" and those
of rights activists, advocates, or movement leaders, including NGO
activists who are Thai, American, or European.26 The distinction seems
to turn on the assumption that the latter embrace rights and thus
inhabit what Barbara Yngvesson has called the "imaginary of neoliberal
culture."27 These distinctions make sense in the context of his argument
challenging the assumptions of vertical diffusion models of rights
consciousness. And it is important to repeat that Engel does not exclude
in advance the possibility that ordinary people find rights meaningful.
That said, I offer here a slightly different, if complementary view that
underlines the importance of self-consciously studying ordinary people
who are rights activists on the ground and the ways in which they often
challenge rather than embrace neoliberal ideas and values.
It is relevant to note that most of the subjects whom I, as a political
scientist, study are engaged in struggles over rights and are to some
extent advocates of rights; I sometimes refer to them as "activists."28
Indeed, I take disputes over rights as a criterion of research case study
selection, although I try not to presume that individual subjects
engaged in or affected by such struggles are necessarily or uniformly
invested in rights as a meaningful cultural discourse. And most of my
studies find a range of variation in consciousness about law and,
specifically, rights, although my case selection criteria lead to more
people in the "high rights consciousness" end of the continuum than one
finds in most of Engel's work. Most of these rights activists that I
encounter tend to be very ordinary people, and rights grow from very
familiar everyday contexts of community life. For example, most of the
women I studied for my book Rights at Work were making very low
wages, were variably educated, and were typically from working class
families. Moreover, my interviews revealed that for most of their lives
many never thought of themselves as feminists or rights activists and
did not think much about rights at all. They were underpaid working or
lower middle-class women, stuck in local contexts and resigned to dead-
end economic situations that seemed normal and thus perhaps beyond
change. Many of them also worked for significant periods in offices
where posters celebrating rights hung, largely unnoticed and lacking in
salient meaning, much like the Thai students in Engel's anecdote.
26. Engel, supra note 3, at 446-47.
27. Id. at 455.
28. See MCCANN, supra note 20.
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Indeed, systematic study of their life histories almost surely would
provide little clue into their rapid development of a quite deep and
robust rights consciousness.
However, I documented dramatic changes in the rights
consciousness of many working women that followed from social and
political changes in the women's immediate, local environment. These
included failures in workplace collective bargaining, intransigent
obstacles to job advancement, increasing hardships amidst tough
economic times, escalating talk about rights among peer workers and
union shop stewards, and some small disputes that escalated to
aggravate a sense of grievance. For some women, going through a
divorce-how ordinary and everyday in America!-was the first step in
shifting from a very low to high rights consciousness, and often the
transition was extremely rapid. Lawyers were sometimes involved, but
they rarely seemed very influential to most people I interviewed, at
least in any direct way; indeed, lawyers were viewed warily. What
changed these women was not the routine character of their social
position or elite messaging, but rather changes in the social
environment to which they responded, in the process stimulating or
amplifying new facets of rights consciousness that added new chapters
to their personal histories. And even as many became "activists," or
even "leaders," they remained extremely ordinary people. They were
still poorly paid, still experienced few opportunities for advancement at
work, and still devoted Friday nights to the bowling league or kids'
school events as the weekend indulgence. Although, many did gain some
self-respect and respect from others and also added new routines in
their modes of thinking and practice that reflected the enhanced
salience of rights, there is nothing extraordinary and much that is
everyday about such episodes of rights-based engagement. Once the
context of disputing deescalated and opportunities for challenge were
eclipsed by developments near and far, many of the subjects I studied
settled down into activity where rights took on uncertain, variable
positions in their practical activity.
These changes in rights consciousness of women in the pay equity
story were relatively sudden, but sometimes shifts are more slow, and
incremental, as Engel suggests. This is well exemplified by my current
study with George Lovell of immigrant Filipino cannery workers. Much
of our historical work about the first generation of poor immigrants in
pre-Cold War America is grounded in archived personal correspondence,
union meeting minutes, memoirs, and the like. The fictionalized
autobiography of Carlos Bulosan, himself a peasant in the colonial
Philippines who immigrated to work in the United States mainland,
provides a wonderful supplement to these archives. The first half of
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Bulosan's narrative documents the transition from life in a rural
homeland village to the experience of an exploited migrant worker
subjected to ceaseless racist subjugation, violence, harassment, and
fear. For him, to be a Filipino in America is to be a criminal based on his
past of being a "union propagandist/agitator and nomadic exile: '. . . I
feel like a criminal running away from a crime I did not commit. And
the crime is that I am a Filipino in America .... It was now the year
(1941) of the great hatred; the lives of Filipinos were cheaper than those
of dogs."' 29
If low status and powerlessness connote ordinariness in much of the
scholarship on legal consciousness, Filipinos were among the most
ordinary denizens of America at the time. It is relevant that Bulosan
recounts in detail the subjugation directly and indirectly felt at the
hands of U.S. law; law came after him and his fellow immigrants, and
their primary response was to run, evade, and hide rather than to reach
out for law. Indeed, the word "rights" does not even show up in his
famous chronicle, American is in the Heart, until the second half of the
narrative, as Allos (the lead character) and his friends become involved
in organizing for a union and other political solidarity associations. He
found meaning in rights through collective action and communal
connection-with his Filipino brothers in the union they built, in the
strongly rights-oriented leftist International Longshore and Warehouse
Union (ILWU) that eventually took them as an affiliate, and in the
groups allied with the Popular Front that began to embrace the
promises of universal human rights to challenge expanding imperialism
and capitalism. All this time, Bulosan, like his colleagues, remained
poor, homeless, migratory, and increasingly overtaken by illness.
One important point that we underline by historical analysis of the
Filipino experience is that the immigrants did not reach out for law
until after law brutalized them. Their eventual embrace of legal tactics
and rights claims, including in regular local litigation and various
moments of high stakes federal litigation, was largely a desperate
defensive gambit to avoid incarceration, deportation, and vigilante
violence, as well as to open opportunities to marry whites, own property,
and organize a union. They eventually became extremely legalistic in
fighting off repression during the era of McCarthyism, taking extreme
measures to organize internally along highly legalistic, rule-bound, and
procedurally rigorous lines, again largely to protect themselves and
elevate their status as good citizens even while they mobilized as
29. CARLOS BULOSAN, ON BECOMING FILIPINO 9 (E. San Juan, Jr. ed., 1995) (emphasis
added) (quoting CARLOs BULOSAN, SOUND OF FALLING LIGHT: LETTERS IN EXILE 199
(Delores Feria ed., 1960)).
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advocates for socialist transformation. 30 In this regard, legal rights were
not just one of many available cultural resources from which to choose;
they were a necessary tool to challenge the extremely repressive law
imposed on them by legal elites and dominant groups, the only resource
initially available to the isolated immigrants for challenging unjust
violence and to create a space for political organization. Consistent with
Engel, studying the histories of these immigrants is critical to
understanding how they developed a rights consciousness and how that
consciousness increasingly became a source of defiant, progressive
activism against repressive and liberal law alike.
Following from Lovell's analysis of studies about legal consciousness
in the United States, I repeat: precisely because there is reason to
expect that many people are unengaged in rights struggles, we should
embrace studies of those who do take rights seriously in order to
understand better how and when this sometimes happens and what it
means. A comparatively oriented approach to rights consciousness
makes this agenda imperative. 31 I doubt that Engel would disagree with
this claim, and in fact his Article may invite such agreement, but it
bears amplification.
C. More Sociology and Power, Please
These insights in turn raise a related set of points regarding how
horizontal study should be designed. Taking seriously Engel's
invocation to focus on the ordinary and everyday lives suggests the need
for a more refined, sophisticated sociological vernacular for defining
different groups of subjects or subject positions, and for analyzing the
social environment from which their experiences develop over time. The
difference between Merry's NGO activists and Thai villagers is not just
30. This empirical story will be developed in our developing book, A UNION BY LAW. See
Michael McCann & George Lovell, Beyond Legal Mobilization: Rethinking Rights and
Power (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (an early version of this
account). See also RON CHEW, REMEMBERING SILME DOMINGO AND GENE VIERNES: THE
LEGACY OF FILIPINO AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM (2012).
31. A splendid example of focusing on rights claiming and resistance by ordinary
people, studied from a horizontal perspective, are the essays in ENGAGING THE LAW IN
CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
The essays by Kevin J. O'Brien on the "rightful resistance" of peasants and by Diamant on
rights mobilization of rural women are particularly relevant to my discussion. Kevin J.
O'Brien, Law and Society in the People's Republic of China, in id. at 1; Kevin J. O'Brien,
Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, in id. at 31; Neil J.
Diamant, Hollow Glory: The Politics of Rights and Identity Among PRC Veterans in the
1950s, in id. at 131.
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the degrees of meaning they accorded to rights, but the quite different
social environments and relationships to other people that shaped their
experience and development of consciousness.
Both Engel and Merry provide useful descriptions of the social
contexts of Thai villagers and NGO activists, but many potentially
relevant factors are left out of those discussions. The factors that are
addressed are not informed much by trying to identify, in general terms,
the features of organized social life that make sense of specific social
positions. 32 We would benefit from analysis that helps to parse the form
and character of these subjects' significant relationships to other
persons; the institutional forces that support or silence their various
discourses and practices; the modes of relative dependence or
independence on one another; and the other factors that help to make
sense of the conditions from which different types of legal consciousness
develop. Engel does, of course, compellingly invoke changing work life
that follows global economic organization to help explain weakening
village norms. However, other factors are likely to matter as well, and
some effort to identify discrete factors in more generalizable and
systematic terms is worthwhile. It is important to underline that I am
not endorsing the positivistic goal of specifying such variables so as to
enable predictions about consciousness based on analysis of social
position and organizational context. Indeed, my own work challenges
such structural determinism. However, I do think that a more refined
approach to analyzing the latter can help to make sense of the former.33
Engel and Merry make important steps in that direction, and I only
urge more. The motivation is that only by such analytical inquiry can
we develop a more richly comparative understanding about the social
construction of rights consciousness and meaning. Additionally, if
changes in subject position and context significantly alter consciousness
and action regarding rights, then careful analysis is necessary to help
explain the transformation. In short, I urge the integration of more
sociological analysis along with the ethnographic inquiry into
experience and meaning.
32. To their credit, the Engels include "Community, Social Networks, and
Relationships" as one of the five subjects they investigated regarding the effects of
globalization on legal culture. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 2, at 5. Among the many
sociological categories that might be developed to inform such analysis of subject position,
I would strongly urge "class," wealth, wealth source, and status. See Carroll Seron &
Frank Munger, Law and Inequality: Race, Gender... and, of Course, Class, 22 ANN. REV.
SOC. 187 (1996).
33. In RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION, I use
a framework reconstructed from social movement theory, emphasizing various types of
resources and opportunities that did or not shape possibilities for action. See MCCANN,
supra note 20.
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Moreover, a major difference between Engel's mode of horizontal
study and the seemingly similar type of study that I and some other
scholars undertake is Engel's relative inattention to matters of power.
Or more precisely, I discern implications of power throughout his new
Article, and much of his earlier work, but Engel seems disinclined to
make much of them in explicit terms. Take, for example, Engel's
intriguing discussion about how Thai villagers continued to find rights a
relatively alien or meaningless discourse, while meanwhile also no
longer finding norms and conventions that once inhered in the local
village culture very meaningful or helpful when seeking redress for
injuries.34
That strikes me as a statement about increasing powerlessness, in
the manner analyzed by sociologists like John Gaventa and many
scholars who study domination and the possibilities of resistance. 35
Moreover, Engel's Article could probe questions regarding whether this
powerlessness to deal with injury extended to other facets of social life.
For example, was anyone else either benefiting from or being
empowered by these types of developments? Was economic power of
these or other subjects increasing due to global economic integration
even as power to redress injury declined, or are these related
dimensions of disempowerment? Is this another story about the advance
of global corporate power and decreasing resources of those dependent
on such power? My understanding of power refers not just to the
instrumental capacities of individuals, but also to the power of
institutional arrangements, relationships among groups, and discourses
and ideas that shape possible agendas.3 6 Put another way, developing
greater focus on power would add a political dimension to go along with
the sociological dimension urged previously to make sense of context for
experience in comparative terms.
This is especially true because Engel does not contest that
information, narratives, discourses, and values are increasingly
produced by mass corporate organizations and groups at national and
transnational levels for consumption at distant local sites. This fact
makes careful analysis of the multiple layers of cultural knowledge
production that converge at any site relevant. I offer an example from a
34. The Engels do mention "power" a few times in their book, mostly to refer to unequal
wealth, position, or status, but "power" is not developed as a conceptual framework. ENGEL &
ENGEL, supra note 2.
35. E.g., JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN
AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980).
36. My own work draws heavily on various adaptations of the three-dimensional model
of power outlined by Steven Lukes and applied by Gaventa. See STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A
RADICAL VIEW (1974); GAVENTA, supra note 35.
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previous well-known study by Engel that greatly influenced my own
subsequent research and teaching. In my all-time favorite article on
socio-legal issues, "The Oven Bird's Song," Engel presented evidence
about how community pressure by insiders discouraged personal injury
litigation and rights claiming, which was defined as anti-communitarian
behavior characteristic of "outsiders," in a Midwestern suburban site he
renamed Sander County. 37 It is a marvelous study of how legal norms
are constructed in ways that discourage and even stigmatize rights
claiming by citizens, which especially disadvantaged lower income
newcomers with little social status or connections to powerful insiders.
Again, while the story is arguably very much about power, Engel does
not frame it directly that way. The ways in which these dynamics
privileged insider elites over other insiders is hinted at, but not
developed by Engel. Moreover, Engel was very careful to underline that
these dynamics were uniquely internal to a local, rural community in
transition, largely removed from organized cultural and economic forces
at the national, much less global, level.
However, some years later, William Haltom and 138 found that these
very same dynamics of stigmatizing rights claiming for redress of
personal injuries were evident since the late 1970s across the nation.
Moreover, we traced the sources of the key ideas and norms
discouraging rights claiming to the convergence of well-funded
campaigns by large scale mega-corporations, the national news media,
and the long privileged cultural ideology of individual responsibility
that was actively mobilized to wage the national "culture wars." In
short, Engel's compelling story of rural community dynamics looks far
less parochial and localized when analysis focusing on national level
organizational and ideological forces are introduced. When one looks at
the forms of organized power that privilege some and discourage others
"available ideas" appear different.
It is relevant in this regard that we were very careful to resist
claiming that these larger forces from "above" were directly shaping the
legal consciousness of variously situated citizens, while also saturating
popular culture at many levels. While there was scattered evidence of
various types to confirm some significant but variable impact, we
insisted that different types of studies-very much like those that Engel
now labels "horizontal"-would be necessary to discern actual
transformations in legal consciousness. My point here is that rejecting a
simplistic vertical diffusion model should not discourage recognizing
how distant corporate and political forms of organizational power can
37. Engel, supra note 8.
38. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAw: POLITICS, MEDIA,
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
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invade local contexts, saturate discourse, and alter opportunities or
options in ways that matter for legal rights consciousness and practical
action. Horizontal studies of meaning alone strike me as too limiting. An
adequate analysis of context and subject position in disputes requires
taking power, in all its multiple manifestations and at all levels-local,
national, transnational-seriously. In some ways, of course, my point
further amplifies Engel's argument that we need both vertical and
horizontal approaches, although I am suggesting that they can be
combined rather than developed separately.
It is worth noting examples of other studies that make an effort to
take power seriously at multiple levels without over-determining top-
down influence on individuals in local communities. Gaventa's own
powerful sociological study39 begins by trying to make sense of why
Appalachian workers in one context did not organize to challenge the
exploitive work conditions they face, while workers elsewhere did act.
His study examines a variety of instrumental, institutional, and
ideological forces that together contribute to an absence of resources and
opportunities for effective action by locals, to the resigned sense of what
he calls "powerlessness." In socio-legal terms, he is explaining why
rights mean and matter little to working people in this context. Or
consider Gilliom's previously discussed study of poor welfare mothers in
Appalachia. 4° Gilliom's research employed working-class, lower-income
women to study welfare mothers in a masterful version of horizontal
study. His findings parallel those of Engel in that the welfare mothers
found rights a relatively meaningless concept and impractical resource
to address their problems of subjugated dependence on invasive,
controlling caseworkers. Gilliom describes this powerless position in
graphic terms and analyzes how the social context of these women is
radically different from those contexts where low-wage women found
rights to be meaningful and empowering. In fact, Gilliom explains
clearly that virtually all of the many social factors that supported rights
activism in my study of pay equity politics were absent for rural
Appalachian welfare mothers.41
It is not difficult to look outside of the United States for similar
efforts. Bernadette Atuahene's recent study of landless rural South
African blacks42 takes a similar tack in explaining the lack of rights-
based legal mobilization to claim reparations promised by legislation.
Athuahene underlines that the promises of rights rang hollow for the
subjects she studied in large part because they lack organized
39. GAVENTA, supra note 35.
40. GILLIOM, supra note 13.
41. Id. at 83-92.
42. See Atuahene & Sibanda, supra note 17.
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associational bonds, political allies, lawyers, money, and knowledge of
both legislated entitlements and the means by which they might pursue
rights claims. Given their social alienation from governance, rights were
somewhere between an empty promise and no promise at all. By
contrast, Arzoo Osanloo's fascinating horizontal ethnography of
developing everyday rights discourse among women goes a long way
toward explaining the factors of social position, social context, state
development, and political relationships that nurture development of
rights consciousness. 43
All of the subjects in these studies have taken seriously available
cultural discourses and relied on ethnographic techniques to investigate
rights consciousness and meaning. But the authors have also used tools
of social analysis to parse the context of power and position that help to
increase our understanding about conditions that nurture more-or
less-rights consciousness and their implications for altering power
relations. Again, none of these scholars is trying to build predictive
causal theory; the goal instead is to analyze how social organization and
power condition experience and meaning construction in complex,
varying ways. The studies exemplify the type of horizontal research that
Engel celebrates, but their attention to power and context goes a step or
two further in linking meaning to power and context. This enterprise is
equally important, but even more challenging amidst the processes of
global economic and political change.
D. Beyond Quantity: The Variable Content of Rights Consciousness
The preceding discussion leads to my final point. Engel's Article
focuses almost exclusively on horizontal study of differences in how
much or how little variously situated subjects find meaning in rights, or
how much rights figure into the subjects' legal consciousness. Engel's
discussion implies a general assessment about how much rights matter
on a single-poled continuum; one presumes that different studies would
register like a sliding dimmer switch, from high to low to none.
However, most of the studies that I have invoked of ordinary, or
subaltern, persons fighting over rights, underline the variability in the
content of rights constructions as much as the degree of their salience.
The evidence suggests that meaningful investments of many citizens in
rights very often do not entail agreement with official law or the
neoliberal versions endorsed by transnational actors, political elites, and
some scholars. For one thing, most sociolegal scholars assume that
rights are not discrete, insular constructs, but rather they are
43. See ARzoo OSANLOO, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN IRAN (2009).
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contingent, unstable, context-specific, and often take different meanings
in different life circumstances. Rights constructions routinely are mixed
with and shaped by various religious, professional, moral, subcultural,
and other discursive elements. While people in different places may
invoke women's rights or workers' rights or rights to association, for
example, the meanings of those claims almost surely will vary from
place to place, and at different times.
This is illustrated brilliantly by Lovell's study of rights claims made
by variously situated ordinary Americans writing letters to the Civil
Rights Division in pre-WWII. 44 Simply put, the letters reveal an
extraordinary range of rights claims and discourses, often merging
moral, religious, and local norms into the constructions of rights
entitlement, the great majority of which were viewed as far outside the
authorized legal rights discourse by officials. Hence, Lovell's title
invokes the familiar official refrain: This is Not Civil Rights. This point
is also illustrated extremely well by Osanloo's compelling ethnography
exploring the hybrid of Western human rights and Islamic religious
traditions that animate women's rights consciousness in Iran. Indeed,
many scholars have argued that the meanings of rights are likely to
proliferate as global forces and local mobilization continue. 45
Studies of open dissent and challenge often make the variable
content of rights claims and meanings a central point of study. For
example, I devoted a chapter to exploring the wide-ranging nuances of
rights consciousness that interviews revealed in my study of women
pressing for rights to equitable wages. Nearly all, very self-consciously,
departed from and challenged-sometimes quite radically-rights
constructions in official judicial rulings. The women's understandings of
gender, markets, equality, fairness, difference, and sameness, along
with other component features of antidiscrimination rights, routinely
rebuked the neoliberal rhetoric of judges, who were often accused of "not
really understanding law." Moreover, one of the most interesting
features of the Filipino immigrant workers we presently are studying is
the wide range of cultural traditions and sources-from Filipino
traditions of anticolonial dissent, American literary radicals, European
socialist thought, Marxism, and Maoism-that fused into the growing
investment in a radical human rights ideology to challenge liberal and
neoliberal American ideas in U.S. courts and other legal institutions.
44. GEORGE LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS (forthcoming 2012).
45. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social
Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 29 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A.
Rodriguez Garavito eds., 2005).
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One implication of my earlier argument urging horizontal study of
widely varied populations thus is an expansion in our understanding of
the vast array of constructions and meanings that are associated with
rights around the world, including within the United States. We should
look for rights everywhere, but we should no more presume that
expressions of rights will convey singular meaning than, as Engel
warns, presume that rights have any meaning at all for many people in
various social circumstances and times. The legal consciousness of
people in ordinary, everyday life, at all levels of social position, is likely
to be extremely varied. Moreover, we should expect that these assorted
meanings often diverge from and even challenge prevailing,
authoritative forms of Western liberal rights in subtle or even dramatic
ways. Rights talk can, after all, be counter-hegemonic as well as
supportive of hegemony. And it often is among those groups who most
suffer from dominant relationships and their allies that we might expect
such challenging constructions of rights, at least when they do not give
in to resigned powerlessness. 46
E. Local Communities Amidst the Circuits of Power in a Global World
All of these points become, I suggest, even more salient in situations
where harms are identified with the forces of global capitalist
integration and imposition. I use a forthcoming book 47 by my colleague
Angelina Godoy to illustrate a more expanded, multi-level version of
horizontal analysis. Godoy's study concerns the responses to intellectual
property (IP) protections in negotiated trade agreements (especially the
Central American Free Trade Agreement) for corporate drug production
and sales monopolies that reduce affordable access to necessary drugs
for locals in their own communities. Godoy builds her study from the
horizontal perspective of interviewing community members and their
local representatives in select Central American nations about their
relationships with an extremely complicated, ever-shifting array of
capitalist corporations, neoliberal organizations like the World Bank,
human rights NGOs, local progressive health activists, and actors at the
nation-state level. Godoy variously deals with the dynamic, ever-
46. One core implication of my argument is that equating all rights talk with the
"imaginary of neoliberal culture" may be overbroad and underspecified. That said, a useful
counterpoint to my own wariness in this regard is PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY
OF MODERN LAW (2002).
47. Angelina Godoy, Writing Globalization's Rulebook: Health, Human Rights, and
Intellectual Property in Central America, 2011 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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changing relationships among these actors advancing their cause in
terms of both relative institutional power and varying ideological
constructions of rights. At the most general level, she shows that the
costs to health care because of multistate negotiated trade agreements
are far too indirect and causally complex to fit the traditional model of
state-inflicted violence against innocent victims in civil society-in
short, the types of harms that liberal human rights conventions
developed a reputation for effectively challenging in earlier decades.
Indeed, many state actors who were part of the developing
transnational capitalist elite became complicit in negotiating and
implementing the terms of the harmful new trade policies on behalf of
free-market rights and the public good.
Godoy does find that rights figure prominently among local people
and a host of other parties who become involved in the dispute. In the
early stages of the intellectual property debates, Godoy shows a basic
disconnect developed between locals in various countries, who viewed
commitments to health rights as a matter of community planning for
social justice, and transnational human rights actors, who tended to
focus on technical experts and doctors fighting disease. This disjuncture
in general orientations to rights was paralleled by disconnects between
the responses of NGOs and local progressive activists to new IP
agreements and the costs that they imposed, especially on the goal of
increasing access to generic drugs. Meanwhile, in some countries like
Guatemala and Costa Rica, rights claiming and formal litigation by
locals to increase access to expensive drugs increased dramatically in an
effort to develop local solutions. While many litigants won in court,
however, litigation of individualized rights claims occurred in ways that
actually ended up extending corporate control and impeding
development of coordinated state policies that might deal with the
structural issues in terms of social rights.
Godoy concludes with a rich discussion about the complexities of the
supposed clash between human rights and free trade versions of IP
policy. Not only has the free trade position of corporations been more
cynically imperial than neoliberal, Godoy argues, but she also traces a
divergence of human rights approaches to the issues. In particular, she
underlines the development of a more social rights vision of state
responsibility that grew from Latin American local rights traditions and
clashed with the more libertarian, anti-statist type of human rights
popular in the Global North. In recent years, Godoy shows, there has
been something of a realignment of key NGOs with these more social
justice oriented grassroots visions of rights that provide some reason for
hope, although the institutional mechanisms for leveraging these rights
conceptions into counter-hegemonic power remain elusive. In short, she
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shows an opposite direction in the flow of transformative influence, as
NGO groups altered their constructions of rights in ways that were
responsive to the traditions of the local grassroots community. My key
point here, however, is that Godoy connects a horizontal study of local
rights construction over time with a variety of both organizational
actors and competing rights constructions at the transnational and state
levels. Her study is a superb example of horizontal analysis that begins
locally but expands the horizons of relational power, institutional
context, and dynamic, ever-changing reconstructions of rights
meanings.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by underlining my strong endorsement of David Engel's
analysis exposing the problematic assumptions of a vertical, top-down
approach to the diffusion of rights and the often confident faith
espoused by some policy elites and scholars that liberal rights talk is a
beneficial advance for all, or even most, people and situations. I also
want to heartily endorse what Engel calls the horizontal approach to
careful study of legal consciousness that is grounded in ethnographic,
interview-intensive methods and not biased by presumptions about
expected findings-especially those findings that verify vague
assumptions regarding the spread of a uniform, Western, neoliberal
rights consciousness. But my reflections also have underlined that we
need to cast our nets of horizontal inquiry broadly to multiple groups of
actors and, in the process, to develop more refined frameworks for
specifying social position, analyzing social context, and parsing
interdependencies of power at local, national, and transnational levels.
In this way, we can expand, thicken, and render more comparatively
oriented and interactive knowledge about the legal consciousness of
differently situated subjects and the wide variations in the degrees of
commitment to rights, in the content of rights that they construct, and
in how these constructed practical meanings do or do not figure into
processes of social change.
